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Legal Ethics
Patrick Emery Longan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers the period from June 1, 2020, to May 31, 2021. 1
The Article discusses developments concerning attorney discipline, bar
admission and reinstatement, malpractice and other civil claims,
ineffective assistance of counsel, disqualification of counsel and conflicts
of interest, judicial conduct and recusal, attorney’s fees and liens,
contempt, formal advisory opinions, amendments to the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, and one miscellaneous matter.
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE
A. Disbarments
1. Trust Accounts and Other Financial Issues
Five lawyers lost their licenses during the Survey period due to
misconduct with respect to their trust accounts or because of other
financial improprieties. 2
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted Evelyn A. Miller’s petition for
the voluntary surrender of her license after she consented to the
revocation of her law license in Virginia. 3 The misconduct in Virginia
concerned Ms. Miller’s work for a title agency at the same time as she
had her own law practice. Her primary role for the title agency was to
*William

Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Mercer University School of Law; Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of Sussex
(M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Texas.
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics during the Survey Period of June 1, 2019, to
May 31, 2020, see Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 72
MERCER L. REV. 165 (2020).
2. Lawyers in Georgia can submit petitions for voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-227 (2021). The acceptance of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment (sometimes described as a voluntary surrender of the lawyer’s license) is
tantamount to disbarment by the court and is treated as such in this Article.
3. In re Miller, 311 Ga. 81, 855 S.E.2d 628 (2021).
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supervise settlements, and for six transactions there were significant
sums (totaling more than $250,000) that were to be held in a designated
escrow account post-closing. Instead, Ms. Miller wired the funds into her
law firm’s checking account, and she admitted that the funds for four of
the transactions were spent.4
David R. Sicay-Perrow defaulted in the disciplinary process and
thereby admitted allegations that led the supreme court to disbar him. 5
Mr. Sicay-Perrow settled a civil claim for two clients but deposited the
settlement proceeds into his business checking account rather than his
firm’s trust account. Over the next few years, Mr. Sicay-Perrow did not
send his clients their funds and repeatedly failed to communicate with
his clients. He eventually sent them several checks, one from his business
checking account rather than his trust account and several trust account
checks that sent the clients funds that belonged to other clients and left
the trust account without sufficient funds to repay the money owed to
those other clients. The supreme court found that there were aggravating
factors, including Mr. Sicay-Perrow’s thirty years of experience,
dishonest conduct, and prior disciplinary history. 6
Joseph Harold Turner Jr. defaulted in the disciplinary process and
was disbarred.7 Mr. Turner represented a client in a civil case and was
wired his client’s settlement funds. Mr. Turner did not, however, turn
the funds over to the client or respond to the client’s inquiries about the
matter. Separately, Mr. Turner’s trust account became overdrawn, and
he failed to respond to the State Bar’s inquiries about the overdraft. 8
Neil Richard Flit voluntarily surrendered his license after two
grievances were filed against him. 9 Mr. Flit admitted that he settled
personal injury cases and deposited the proceeds into his trust account
but did not account for or deliver the funds to the administrator of the
client’s estate (in one case) or to the client (in the other case). 10
The Georgia Supreme Court also disbarred Leighton Reid Berry Jr. 11
Mr. Berry, who had been disciplined four times before, could not be found
and was served by publication. When he did not respond to the notice of
discipline, Mr. Berry was deemed to have admitted the allegations
against him, which concerned his representation of a personal injury

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 81–82, 855 S.E.2d at 629.
In re Sicay-Perrow, 310 Ga. 855, 854 S.E.2d 728 (2021).
Id. at 858, 854 S.E.2d at 730.
In re Turner, 311 Ga. 204, 857 S.E.2d 197 (2021).
Id. at 204, 857 S.E.2d at 198–99.
In re Flit, 309 Ga. 440, 846 S.E.2d 403 (2020).
Id. at 441, 846 S.E.2d at 403.
In re Berry, 310 Ga. 158, 848 S.E.2d 71 (2020).
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client. Mr. Berry did not enter into a written agreement with his client
or explain the basis for his fees and expenses. Although Mr. Berry and
the client agreed that Mr. Berry would pay the client’s physical therapist
from the settlement proceeds, Mr. Berry failed to do so and neglected to
inform his client of the settlement or of his failure to pay the therapist.
Mr. Berry misappropriated the funds that were to be used to pay the
therapist and did not maintain proper records related to the settlement
funds.12
2. Client Abandonment and Lack of Communication
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred three lawyers for misconduct
that included client abandonment and lack of communication.
George Michael Plumides was disbarred after he defaulted in
connection with five different disciplinary matters. 13 The court described
the misconduct as “a pattern of abandoning clients in civil and criminal
matters.”14 Mr. Plumides’s misconduct included failure to disburse
settlement proceeds to clients, failure to appear for calendar calls, a
contempt finding for which he was jailed for five weeks, payment of a
client’s filing fees with a bad check, and failure to respond to his clients’
requests for information about their case. The supreme court found
several aggravating factors, including prior discipline, dishonest or
selfish motives, a pattern of misconduct with multiple offenses, refusal
to acknowledge wrongful conduct, vulnerable victims, substantial
experience, and indifference to restitution. 15
Patrick A. Powell was disbarred for his abandonment of a client in a
criminal case.16 By defaulting in the disciplinary matter, Mr. Powell
admitted that he undertook to represent the client and entered an
appearance but thereafter failed to do any work on the case, to appear at
pretrial and status conferences, or to respond to requests for an update
on the case or to efforts of the court and prosecutor to contact him. In
aggravation of discipline, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the
Special Master that Mr. Powell had received prior punishment, had a
dishonest or selfish motive, and engaged in a pattern of misconduct
concerning a vulnerable victim, even though he had substantial
experience in the practice of law.17

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 158, 848 S.E.2d at 71–72.
In re Plumides, 311 Ga. 65, 855 S.E.2d 651 (2021).
Id. at 66, 855 S.E.2d at 651.
Id. at 66–67, 855 S.E.2d at 651–52.
In re Powell, 310 Ga. 859, 854 S.E.2d 731 (2021).
Id. at 860, 854 S.E.2d at 732 n.1.
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The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the petition for voluntary
surrender of Ernest Redwine’s license. 18 Mr. Redwine undertook to
represent a client in a personal injury matter and falsely told the client
that he was working on the case. The day before the statute of limitations
would have run, he filed an action but failed to have the defendant served
and declined to appear for a calendar call. The trial court dismissed the
case with prejudice, but Mr. Redwine did not inform his client of that
fact. Concerning mitigation and aggravation, the court found that Mr.
Redwine did not have a prior disciplinary record but that he acted with
a dishonest motive and had substantial experience in the practice of
law.19
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred Majd M. Ghanayem as a matter
of reciprocal discipline after he lost his license in Texas. 20 The Texas
panel disbarred Mr. Ghanayem based on his misconduct in his
representation of a client who wished to file an involuntary
relinquishment of her son’s biological father’s parental rights. Mr.
Ghanayem failed to file the case on time and neglected to keep the client
reasonably informed. In fact, Mr. Ghanayem gave his client a fraudulent
order with the forged signature of a judge. 21
3. Criminal Activity
Three lawyers were disbarred as a result of criminal conduct.
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the voluntary surrender of
Vincent Chidozie Otuonye’s license. 22 Mr. Otunonye was convicted of the
felony of Criminal Attempt to Furnish Prohibited Items (tobacco) to
Inmates.23
Elizabeth Vila Rogan voluntarily surrendered her license.24 She was
indicted on one count of forgery because she signed a judge’s initials to
an order without obtaining the judge’s express permission. Ms. Rogan
pled nolo contendere under the First Offender Act to the crime of
obstruction of an officer.25 She admitted that she violated Rule 4.1, Rule
8.4(a)(3), and Rule 8.4(a)(4).26
18. In re Redwine, 311 Ga. 287, 857 S.E.2d 193 (2021).
19. Id. at 288, 857 S.E.2d at 194.
20. In re Ghanayem, 311 Ga. 366, 857 S.E.2d 681 (2021).
21. Id. at 366–67, 857 S.E.2d at 682.
22. In re Otuonye, 309 Ga. 584, 847 S.E.2d 193 (2020).
23. Id. at 584, 847 S.E.2d at 193.
24. In re Rogan, 309 Ga. 583, 847 S.E.2d 308 (2020).
25. Id.
26. Id. See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1 (making a false statement of material
fact), r. 8.4(a)(3) (conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the conduct
relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), r. 8.4(a)(4) (engaging in professional conduct
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The Georgia Supreme Court accepted Don Smart’s voluntary
surrender of his license after Mr. Smart pled guilty to theft by
conversion.27 The theft involved Mr. Smart’s service as an administrator
of an estate and his sale of real property of the estate for more than
$500,000. Rather than deposit the funds into his trust account, Mr.
Smart converted the funds to his own use. 28
4. Miscellaneous Disbarments
Four other lawyers lost their Georgia licenses during the Survey
period.
Cynthia Ann Lain was disbarred after she engaged in misconduct in
connection with five disciplinary cases. 29 Ms. Lain’s failure to comply
with her discovery obligations in those cases led the Special Master to
strike her answers, finding that her conduct amounted to at least
reckless disregard for the process and for those involved in it and, at
worst, was an intentional effort to avoid or delay the process. Because
her answers were stricken, Ms. Lain was deemed to have admitted the
allegations in the five formal complaints pending against her. Those
underlying cases involved repeated failure to appear for court hearings,
numerous findings of contempt (including bench warrants for her arrest),
misrepresentations to courts about her unavailability to attend hearings,
and failing to respond to client inquiries or to take required steps upon
being discharged. The Special Master and the supreme court applied the
American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline and
concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.30
Daniel Lee Dean, who was being treated for terminal cancer, sought
to voluntarily surrender his license to resolve three grievances against
him.31 Mr. Dean promised not to seek reinstatement if he recovered from
his illness, and the supreme court accepted the voluntary surrender of
Mr. Dean’s license.32
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the voluntary surrender of the
license of Pamela Sturdivant Stephenson.33 Ms. Stephenson petitioned to
surrender her license in response to a grievance alleging numerous
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), r. 8.4(a)(8) (commission and
admission in judicio of a criminal act that adversely reflects upon a lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness).
27. In re Smart, 309 Ga. 336, 845 S.E.2d 688 (2020).
28. Id.
29. In re Lain, 311 Ga. 427, 857 S.E.2d 668 (2021).
30. Id. at 436–38, 857 S.E.2d at 675.
31. In re Dean, 310 Ga. 100, 849 S.E.2d 424 (2020).
32. Id. at 101, 849 S.E.2d at 425.
33. In re Stephenson, 310 Ga. 6, 849 S.E.2d 171 (2020).
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violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.34
The supreme court disbarred Dennis W. Hartley as reciprocal
discipline after Mr. Hartley was disbarred in Colorado for numerous
violations of the Colorado disciplinary rules. 35 Those violations included
failure to report multiple DUI convictions as required by the Colorado
rules. They also included failing to deposit retainers into his trust
account, failing to return unearned fees upon being discharged, failing to
communicate with clients, filing a proceeding without the knowledge of
a client, practicing with and sharing fees with non-lawyers, and
practicing with a suspended license.36
B. Suspensions
The Georgia Supreme Court suspended three lawyers during the
Survey period.37
The supreme court dealt with several straightforward issues and one
of first impression when it suspended Christopher John Palazzola.38 Two
associates left Mr. Palazzola’s firm. When a client called the firm to speak
to one of them, a staff member told the client that the (now-former)
associate was not available; the client was not informed that the
associate had left the firm. Later the same client was told that the lawyer
had departed, but the staff member falsely stated that the lawyer’s
contact information could not be provided. Another client decided to be
represented by one of the departed lawyers. When Mr. Palazzola’s firm
received correspondence relating to the client’s matter, the firm sent the
correspondence back to the sender rather than forward it to the departed
lawyer. A third client asked to have her file sent to one of the former
associates, but Mr. Palazzola failed to do so for weeks. The supreme court
agreed with the Special Master and the review board that these facts
established violations of Mr. Palazzola’s duty to help a client who
discharged his firm and his duty to train and supervise his non-lawyer
staff regarding his professional responsibilities. 39
34. Id. at 6, 849 S.E.2d at 171. See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(4) (misconduct
to engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
35. In re Hartley, 309 Ga. 831, 848 S.E.2d 432 (2020).
36. Id. at 832, 848 S.E.2d at 433.
37. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
38. In re Palazzola, 310 Ga. 634, 853 S.E.2d 99 (2020).
39. Id. at 637–41, 853 S.E.2d at 102–05. See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(d)
(“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably
practicable to protect a client’s interests”), r. 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer
assistants).
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There was also agreement among the Special Master, the review
board, and the supreme court concerning Mr. Palazzola’s misconduct
with his advertising.40 He ran ads falsely stating that his firm’s lawyers
collectively had more than 100 years of experience and that the firm had
offices in Florida and California. Those statements constituted violations
of Rule 7.1 and Rule 8.4(a)(4).41
The issue of first impression related to Mr. Palazzola’s failure to fulfill
his promise to his associates to contribute to retirement accounts as part
of their compensation.42 The associates made their contributions, but Mr.
Palazzola and the firm did not match those contributions as promised.43
The legal question was whether this constituted a violation of Rule
8.4(a)(4) as “professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”44 The supreme court decided that it was unnecessary
to determine whether Mr. Palazzola’s failure to make the retirement
account payments was professional conduct. 45 Regardless of the
resolution of that issue, the court reasoned, the sanction would be the
same: suspension of Mr. Palazzola nunc pro tunc to June 1, 2020, when
he voluntarily ceased practicing law.46 In a concurrence joined by Justice
Boggs and Justice Bethel, Justice Petersen expressed doubt whether the
court should include dishonest conduct involving law firm administration
within the definition of professional conduct, as well as whether the
supreme court’s inherent constitutional authority to regulate the practice
of law extends far enough to permit such an interpretation. 47 The issue
awaits resolution in a future case.48
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted a petition for voluntary
discipline from Thomas William Veach and suspended Mr. Veach for
eighteen months.49 Mr. Veach represented the executor of an estate that
had one beneficiary and one asset encumbered by a Medicaid lien. When
litigation over the lien was resolved, Mr. Veach disbursed the required
amounts to the beneficiary but not to the lienholder. Mr. Veach could not
pay those funds because he removed estate funds without authorization
40. Id. at 638–39, 853 S.E.2d at 103.
41. Id. See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 7.1 (false or misleading advertising), r.
8.4(a)(4) (professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation).
42. Id. at 646–47, 853 S.E.2d at 109.
43. Id. at 636–37, 853 S.E.2d at 102.
44. Id. at 645–50, 853 S.E.2d at 108–10 (quoting GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4(a)(4) (emphasis added)).
45. Id. at 649, 853 S.E.2d at 110.
46. Id. at 648–49, 853 S.E.2d at 110.
47. Id. at 649–50, 853 S.E.2d at 110–11 (Petersen, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. In re Veach, 310 Ga. 470, 851 S.E.2d 590 (2020).
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for several years. The decision to accept the petition required the
weighing of factors in aggravation and mitigation. As to aggravation, Mr.
Veach had substantial experience in the practice of law and acted with a
dishonest or selfish motive. In mitigation, Mr. Veach pointed to personal
and emotional problems brought on by his wife’s death after a long illness
and his heart surgery. Mr. Veach also asserted that he showed remorse
and made a good faith effort at restitution by paying the estate and the
lienholder all the funds he took without authorization. The supreme
court took these factors into account and accepted the request for an
eighteen-month suspension.50
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the second petition for the
voluntary discipline of David Godley Rigdon, who pled guilty and was
sentenced for eight counts of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances
Act; the court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of
either thirty-six months or the expiration of his probation, whichever was
longer.51 The court rejected an earlier petition because it did not contain
sufficient information about the charges of conspiracy and of crossing the
guard lines of a correctional institution with drugs. Mr. Rigdon provided
the missing information. The conspiracy charge resulted from one text
message he sent to his drug dealer and, in the state’s view, did not
indicate a conspiracy. The charges relating to crossing the lines of a
correctional institution arose from the discovery of drugs in Mr. Rigdon’s
car when he was arrested in the jail parking lot; he did not attempt to
take any into the jail. The supreme court considered numerous
mitigating factors in imposing the suspension rather than the usual
sanction of disbarment following a felony conviction. Mr. Rigdon had no
prior disciplinary history and had personal and emotional problems,
including addiction, for which he voluntarily sought treatment. He
suffered from depression and anxiety and underwent treatment for those
conditions. Mr. Rigdon submitted evidence of good character, expressed
remorse, and acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct. His
misconduct did not injure any clients, and under all those circumstances,
the court held that a long suspension was the appropriate sanction. 52
C. Public Reprimands
One attorney was ordered to receive a public reprimand as the
sanction for his misconduct.53 Eugene Shuff Cook was a partner, with two
other lawyers, in a law firm that primarily did personal injury work
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 473, 851 S.E.2d at 593.
In re Rigdon, 310 Ga. 101, 849 S.E.2d 399 (2020).
Id. at 103–04, 849 S.E.2d at 401.
In re Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 857 S.E.2d 212 (2021).
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against railroads, and he was in charge of the firm’s trust account. Over
the course of almost three years, Cook signed forty-five checks (totaling
$1,776,868.07) to the firm for fees earned or expenses incurred before the
corresponding settlement funds had been received. During this period,
the firm was required to hold the settlement funds for three clients
pending resolution of third-party claims against the funds. The amount
that needed to be in the trust account to cover those funds was over
$571,000, but the balance in the trust account was often well below that
for months at a time, including a balance at one point of just $288.82.
Clients were put at risk, but ultimately no client lost money as a result
of these activities.54
The Special Master found that Mr. Cook had violated the rules relating
to trust accounts but had not violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 55 The
Special Master found several mitigating factors and recommended a oneyear suspension. The review board agreed with the Special Master about
the trust account rule violations but found that Mr. Cook violated Rule
8.4(a)(4), and the review board recommended a two-year suspension.56
The supreme court ordered only a public reprimand over the dissent
of Justice Nahmias, which Chief Justice Melton joined.57 The court
deferred to the Special Master’s findings that Mr. Cook did not have any
intent to deceive and therefore did not violate Rule 8.4(a). 58 The court
concluded that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating
factors.59 The Special Master found in mitigation that Mr. Cook had no
prior disciplinary history, had an excellent reputation, and had
experienced serious personal issues (his wife’s illness and
hospitalization). The Special Master made more tepid findings about
restitution and remorse. The Special Master noted that Mr. Cook’s efforts
at restitution were untimely and aided by his partners’ contributions. 60
Mr. Cook expressed remorse, but his attitude during these disciplinary
proceedings “reflected an unwillingness to appreciate the seriousness of
his misconduct or the obligations an attorney has as a fiduciary of clients’
funds.”61 The supreme court also mentioned in mitigation that Mr. Cook
had undertaken steps (interim rehabilitation) to prevent the trust

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 216–17, 857 S.E.2d at 220–21 (Nahmias, P.J., dissenting).
Id. at 207, 857 S.E.2d at 214.
Id.
Id. at 214–15, 857 S.E.2d at 219–20.
Id. at 212–13, 857 S.E.2d at 218.
Id. at 213, 857 S.E.2d at 218–19.
Id. at 211, 857 S.E.2d at 217.
Id.
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account problems from recurring.62 In aggravation, the Special Master
noted that Mr. Cook engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed
multiple offenses, and had substantial experience in the practice of law. 63
The court’s majority opinion had two other noteworthy passages. The
court recited as usual that the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions guide the analysis of the appropriate discipline but specifically
noted that they are “not controlling” and that the level of discipline “rests
in the sound discretion of this [c]ourt.” 64 Second, the court’s opinion
addressed the concerns of the Special Master and some members of the
supreme court about the treatment of Mr. Cook’s partners. They had
been the ones to initiate the grievance process against Mr. Cook when
their partnership was breaking up.65 The other partners benefitted from
the mishandling of the trust account in the same ways as Mr. Cook did,
but they were not subject to any disciplinary process. 66 Furthermore, the
partners stood to benefit economically if Mr. Cook were suspended
because he would not be eligible to serve as “designated counsel” for a
railroad union that regularly sent Mr. Cook clients; the former partners
would be in a position to receive cases that otherwise would have gone to
Mr. Cook.67 The court explicitly refused to treat the disparate treatment
of the partners and Mr. Cook as a mitigating factor in determining the
appropriate level of discipline, but it did criticize the State Bar for failing
to explain why the Bar did not pursue discipline against the partners and
stated that “such failure could encourage lawyers to use the Bar’s
disciplinary process to resolve internal law firm disputes and settle old
scores with former partners.”68 The court characterized such actions as
the “weaponization of the disciplinary process.” 69
Justice Nahmias, joined by Chief Justice Melton, dissented to suggest
suspension rather than reprimand.70 Justice Nahmias detailed the
extent of Mr. Cook’s misconduct and disputed that any of the cases cited
by the majority justified anything less than suspension. 71 The dissent
also particularly addressed the question of the Bar’s disparate treatment
of Mr. Cook and his partners as well as the likely “collateral

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 213, 857 S.E.2d at 218.
Id. at 212, 857 S.E.2d at 218.
Id. at 213, 857 S.E.2d at 218 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 215, 857 S.E.2d at 219.
Id.
Id. at 212, 857 S.E.2d at 217.
Id. at 215, 857 S.E.2d at 219–20.
Id.
Id. at 215–16, 857 S.E.2d at 220 (Nahmias, P.J., dissenting).
Id. at 215–20, 857 S.E.2d at 220–23 (Nahmias, P.J., dissenting).
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consequence”—the loss of designated counsel status and therefore of
business—and concluded that neither should be a mitigating factor in a
disciplinary case.72
D. Review Board Reprimands
Two lawyers received review board reprimands.
Daveniya Fisher received a review board reprimand because she failed
to appear for several hearings in a forfeiture case.73 At the final hearing,
the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the client’s property, but when
Ms. Fisher learned about the order, she did not immediately notify the
client.74 The Special Master found that by these actions, Ms. Fisher
negligently violated her duties of diligence and communication. Although
the forfeiture harmed the client, the Special Master found that it was
unlikely that the result would have been significantly different if Ms.
Fisher had appeared. In mitigation, the Special Master noted that Ms.
Fisher had not been disciplined before; she showed remorse; she had
significant personal problems at the time; she took responsibility for her
actions; she had a cooperative attitude; and she had good character and
reputation. The court also noted some effort at interim rehabilitation in
connection with the management of her practice.75 In aggravation, the
Special Master noted that Ms. Fisher had substantial experience in the
practice of law.76
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the voluntary petition for
discipline in the form of a review board reprimand from Misty Oaks
Paxton. Ms. Paxton had an arrangement to accept referrals from Kealy
Law Center (KLC), a nationwide law firm that marketed loan
modification services. In December 2017, KLC referred a Georgia client
facing foreclosure on his home to Ms. Paxton. Between that time and
August 1, 2018, KLC dealt directly with the client, but Ms. Paxton did
not. The foreclosure sale was scheduled for September 4, 2018. The client
contacted KLC on August 31 to express concern about the imminent sale.
KLC responded that it could not help because the client had not paid the
full amount of the fee owed to KLC. The client paid the rest of the fee
that day, and KLC emailed Paxton, who in turn emailed the client. Her
message was that she was out of town and could not file a bankruptcy
petition to stop the foreclosure sale in time, but that the client could stop
it by printing and filing a petition that was attached to her email. The
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 220, 857 S.E.2d at 223. (Nahmias, P.J., dissenting).
In re Fisher, 311 Ga. 77, 855 S.E.2d 640 (2021).
Id. at 78, 855 S.E.2d at 642.
Id.
Id.
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client could not print the attachment and, as a result, did not file a
bankruptcy petition until the day after the foreclosure sale. The client
hired Atlanta Legal Aid to help him and was able to reach an agreement
with the lender to stay in his home. He then filed a grievance against
Paxton.77
Ms. Paxton’s petition admitted that she violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.2(c),
1.3, and 1.5(e).78 The court considered aggravating and mitigating
factors. In aggravation, Ms. Paxton had substantial experience in the
practice of law.79 In mitigation, the court noted that Ms. Paxton had no
prior disciplinary record and no dishonest or selfish motive; she was
cooperative in the disciplinary process; had good moral character and a
positive reputation; and showed remorse.80
E. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline Rejected
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the third petition for voluntary
discipline (this time for discipline up to a four-month suspension) from
William Leslie Kirby III in connection with four matters. 81 In one, Mr.
Kirby represented a client in a child-support modification but did not
appear for the hearing, failed to respond to the client’s multiple requests
for information, and failed to perform the necessary work for the matter.
The second involved Mr. Kirby’s failure to file a notice of withdrawal as
counsel for a client and failure to respond to new counsel’s request
(including a motion to compel) for the file. In the third, Mr. Kirby was
fired by a divorce client but failed to file a notice of withdrawal. The
fourth matter was also in a divorce action. There, Mr. Kirby stopped
communicating with the client and stopped working on the matter. When
the client fired Mr. Kirby, he promised but failed to send the file to the
client, did not withdraw from the action, and failed to respond to the
client’s inquiries and multiple requests for a refund. The supreme court
acknowledged that Mr. Kirby apparently had taken appropriate steps to
deal with the personal stress and practice management issues that led to
his misconduct, but the court declined to order such a short suspension
for misconduct in multiple client matters. 82

77. In re Paxton, 311 Ga. 363, 364, 857 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2021).
78. Id. at 364–65, 857 S.E.2d at 697; see also GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a)
(failure to abide by the client’s objectives of the representation), r. 1.2(c) (unreasonable
limitation on the scope of her representation), r. 1.3 (lack of diligence), r. 1.5(e) (regarding
division of fees with KLC).
79. In re Paxton, 311 Ga. at 365, 857 S.E.2d at 697.
80. Id.
81. In re Kirby, 309 Ga. 826, 848 S.E.2d 429 (2020).
82. Id. at 830–31, 848 S.E.2d at 431–32.
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The supreme court rejected the petition of Timothy Walter Boyd for
voluntary discipline in the form of a suspension of six to eighteen
months.83 Mr. Boyd admitted that he had undertaken to investigate for
a client whether the client had a basis to challenge the foreclosure and
eviction process that Wells Fargo Bank followed with respect to the
client’s home. Mr. Boyd found no support for such a claim but chose not
to tell the client. Instead, Mr. Boyd investigated the possibility of the
client making a claim against the client’s former attorney, the California
lawyer who had hired Mr. Boyd to be local counsel for the client. Mr. Boyd
falsely reported to the client that he had obtained a default judgment
against the California lawyer and that he would domesticate the
judgment in California. The Special Master found no mitigating factors
and noted in aggravation that Mr. Boyd had been disciplined three times
before for similar conduct, had acted from a dishonest or selfish motive,
engaged in a pattern of misconduct with multiple rule violations, had
substantial experience in the practice of law, and was dealing with a
vulnerable client. The supreme court rejected the petition for voluntary
discipline, noting that it recently imposed an interim suspension on Mr.
Boyd for his failure to respond to a notice of investigation in a new
matter.84
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected a petition from L. Nicole Brantley
for voluntary discipline in the form of review board reprimand. 85 The
State Bar alleged that Ms. Brantley was discharged by a client but
refused to return the unearned portion of her fee. The client initiated fee
arbitration with the Bar, and Ms. Brantley agreed to be bound by the
result; however, she did not appear for the hearing and did not pay the
arbitration award that the client obtained. In response to the client’s
grievance, Brantley denied the client fired her or that she refused to
return an unearned fee, and she also claimed to have had no notice of the
fee arbitration. In her petition for voluntary discipline, however, Ms.
Brantley admitted that the client had discharged her, that she had not
returned the unearned portion of the fee, and that she had not paid the
arbitration award, even though she had agreed to be bound by it. 86
The supreme court rejected her petition in light of her prior
disciplinary history and her lack of candor in the disciplinary process. 87
Ms. Brantley was suspended in 2016 for neglect of client matters,
continuing to practice while under administrative suspension, and for
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

In re Boyd, 310 Ga. 1, 849 S.E.2d 172 (2020).
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failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process. The court, at that time,
found significant mitigating factors that justified leniency.88 In contrast,
Ms. Brantley’s most recent case involved willful misconduct and “little in
the way of mitigation.”89
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline
from William D. Thompson.90 Mr. Thompson was suspended for a year in
Florida for misconduct relating to the mismanagement of his trust
account; the Florida discipline also included a two-year probation period,
in which he is restricted in using a trust account. Mr. Thompson sought
a one-year suspension in Georgia as a reciprocal discipline. The supreme
court rejected the petition because it was deficient in several respects. 91
It did not establish that a one-year suspension in Georgia would be
substantially similar to the Florida discipline, particularly given that his
Florida discipline included such a suspension as well as a two-year
probationary period.92 The Georgia disciplinary process does not allow for
periods of probation.93 Thompson’s petition also failed to attach
documents associated with the Florida discipline, and it did not note that
his Georgia license was under suspension for failing to pay his license
fee.94
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline
from Willie George Davis Jr.95 Mr. Davis wrote a will for his sister, in
which he was named the executor of the estate, guardian of his sister’s
thirteen-year-old son, and conservator of his nephew’s funds. Mr. Davis
did not seek or obtain appropriate consent to the conflict of interest in
preparing a will naming him to serve in these capacities. Unbeknownst
to Mr. Davis, his sister had breast cancer. She died shortly thereafter,
and Mr. Davis came into possession of her life insurance policy proceeds.
Although he initially placed the funds in his IOLTA account, Mr. Davis
eventually created a conservatorship account, but he did not maintain
good records of the funds’ use. After the nephew turned eighteen, he and
Mr. Davis had disagreements that led to litigation in the Fulton County
Probate Court. During extensive proceedings in that court, Mr. Davis
repeatedly failed to appear and did not make a proper accounting of the
funds he held for his nephew. Mr. Davis was found in contempt multiple
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times and was ultimately incarcerated by the court. Mr. Davis was
suffering from depression and anxiety as a result of a series of family
deaths. The nephew eventually obtained a judgment, including courtordered attorney’s fees but not statutory interest, against Mr. Davis of
$193,174.91. Mr. Davis began paying the judgment in installments.96
The Special Master recommended acceptance of the voluntary
petition.97 The petition sought a suspension of at least eighteen months
with conditions for reinstatement. The conditions were that Mr. Davis
would have to provide a certificate of fitness from a licensed mental
health professional that he was fit to practice law and proof that Mr.
Davis had completely satisfied the nephew’s judgment. The supreme
court rejected the petition in part because it could have resulted in a
suspension of as long as fifty years if Mr. Davis continued paying the
judgment at the rate at which he had been paying it, and Georgia does
not allow suspensions of such length.98 Furthermore, the court concluded,
a lawyer should not be permitted to resume practice after a lengthy
separation from the practice of law without some assurance of the
lawyer’s character and competence.99 The court also noted that the
conditions might be too punitive for Davis because conditioning his
return to practice on the ability to satisfy a large judgment would risk
leaving him in “a disciplinary purgatory: if he cannot finish paying
restitution, his discipline will be endless.”100
Jason Lee Van Dyke filed a petition for voluntary discipline relating
to his conviction—via a plea of nolo contendere—in Texas a charge of
making a false report to a law enforcement officer. 101 The Georgia
Supreme Court rejected the petition and ordered fact-finding about
several aspects of the case that it found troubling; two aspects involved
lack of respect for the law and the legal process.102 Before entering his
plea, Mr. Van Dyke violated the terms of his bond to attend a previously
scheduled “waterfowl hunt.”103 Also, a witness against Mr. Van Dyke
disappeared shortly before trial, and the judge entered an order that Mr.
Van Dyke forfeited his right to confront the witness by procuring the
absence of the witness through wrongdoing. Finally, it appeared in the
record that Mr. Van Dyke failed to report to the court that he had been
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Id. at 72–73, 855 S.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 67, 855 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 75, 855 S.E.2d at 649–50.
Id. at 76, 855 S.E.2d at 650.
Id.
In re Van Dyke, 311 Ga. 199, 857 S.E.2d 194 (2021).
Id. at 203, 857 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 200, 857 S.E.2d at 195, n.1.

170

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

sanctioned by the Texas Bar in 2019 in an entirely separate
proceeding.104
III. BAR ADMISSION AND REINSTATEMENT
The Georgia Supreme Court granted the petition for a certificate of
fitness for readmission from Stephen Vincent Fitzgerald Jr. 105 Mr.
Fitzgerald voluntarily surrendered his license in 2011 after failing to
account for and distribute approximately $455,000 that belonged to
others, including a title insurance company and a trust. The Fitness
Board found that Mr. Fitzgerald discharged his burden of demonstrating
rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence, and the supreme court
agreed.106 Mr. Fitzgerald provided evidence that his misconduct, for
which he took responsibility and was remorseful, resulted from a struggle
with substance abuse. He showed his efforts to become and remain sober,
including his participation in Hall County Drug Court, and submitted
letters of recommendation from his therapist and others attesting to his
integrity and potential. The Fitness Board investigated and found no
pending grievances against Mr. Fitzgerald nor any unfulfilled
requirements of restitution. The two victims of Mr. Fitzgerald’s actions
were a title insurance company and a trust. The debt to the title
insurance company was discharged in bankruptcy, and Mr. Fitzgerald
provided evidence to the fitness board that he has been making regular
payments to the trust.107
The Georgia Supreme Court granted the petition for a certificate of
fitness for readmission from James Caleb Clarke III, who voluntarily
surrendered his license in 2002 after he committed numerous acts of
misconduct while acting as an administrator of an estate. 108 Mr. Clarke
used $90,000 of estate money for his personal benefit, appropriated the
use of a car belonging to the estate for his personal benefit, lied to the
heirs when he told them that he had sold the car and deposited the funds
into the estate account, and failed to file income tax returns for the estate
for four years.109
In 2019, Mr. Clarke filed a petition for a certificate of fitness as the
first step in gaining readmission to the Bar. He presented the following
evidence: in 2007, Mr. Clarke obtained a master’s degree in Divinity; he
also has been employed by the same church since 2010, where he
104.
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106.
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currently serves as senior pastor. Mr. Clarke made full restitution to the
heirs and reconciled with them. One of the heirs submitted a letter in
support of Mr. Clarke’s application. Mr. Clarke also presented evidence
of his extensive community service in his role as a pastor and submitted
letters of support from colleagues and members of his congregation. At
his informal conference with the Fitness Board, Mr. Clarke accepted full
responsibility for his actions and expressed a desire to clear his name.
The Fitness Board and the supreme court concluded that Mr. Clarke
showed rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence, and the court
granted the certificate of fitness.110
IV. MALPRACTICE AND OTHER CIVIL CLAIMS
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a malpractice judgment in
Phillips v. Harris.111 The defendant-attorney represented a landlord in a
case against former tenants, who sued the landlord for wrongfully not
returning a security deposit. Although generally landlords can be liable
for treble damages and attorney’s fees for such an action, in Georgia there
is a statutory exemption for landlords who are natural persons and who
own fewer than ten rental units.112 At trial, the attorney for the landlord
briefly mentioned the exemption, but the transcript did not reveal any
point at which the attorney otherwise argued or presented evidence
about the exemption. The attorney claimed that the transcript was
inaccurate and incomplete, but she took no steps to correct it. At the trial
for legal malpractice, the landlord introduced expert testimony showing
the lawyer’s failure to present that defense in the former case failed to
meet the requisite duty of care. With respect to causation and damages,
the landlord presented evidence that he was eligible for the exemption.
The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding by the jury that a reasonable factfinder in the underlying case
would have reached a different result—in other words, that the judge,
who made findings in the underlying case, could reasonably have found
that the landlord was entitled to the exemption had the lawyer presented
the argument and evidence.113
A trial court dismissed a legal malpractice case because the expert
affidavit came from an attorney who, the next day, became a partner in
the law firm that represented the plaintiff. 114 The Georgia Court of
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Appeals reversed.115 The defendants argued that the expert was
incompetent to testify due to a conflict of interest arising from his
partnership in the firm representing the plaintiff, but the court of
appeals rejected this argument.116 The court analyzed the situation first
under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7, the so-called advocatewitness rule.117 With some exceptions, an attorney may not act as an
advocate and be a witness in the same trial.118 However, a member of the
advocate’s firm who is not personally acting as an advocate in the matter
may be a witness, unless the testimony would cause a conflict with the
client.119 For example, there would be a conflict if the testimony were
contrary to the client’s testimony. Here, the expert’s testimony would be
favorable to the client.120 Therefore, as long as the expert was not also
acting as an advocate at trial, there would be no conflict under Rule
3.7.121 The court also rejected the argument that allowing a member of
the plaintiff’s law firm to provide the expert affidavit would defeat the
purpose of the affidavit requirement.122 The court noted that the purpose
of the affidavit requirement is to discourage frivolous lawsuits, and that
purpose is fulfilled when an expert with sufficient qualifications submits
the affidavit.123 The defendants did not challenge the expert’s
qualifications.124
The Georgia Supreme Court dealt with the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in attorney-client engagement agreements in
Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville.125 A former client sued its law
firm for malpractice, and the law firm asked the trial court to compel
arbitration per the arbitration clause in the engagement agreement. The
trial court declined to do so and found that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable because the law firm had not advised the client of the
disadvantages of arbitration. In particular, the trial court held that the

115. Id., 844 S.E.2d at 556.
116. Id. at 501–02, 844 S.E.2d at 558–59.
117. Id.
118. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.7 (2021).
119. Id.
120. Mitchell, 355 Ga. App. at 502, 844 S.E.2d at 559.
121. Id. at 501–02, 844 S.E.2d at 558–59. The court also noted that the actual question
in the case was not about trial testimony but rather a pretrial issue about satisfaction of a
pleading requirement. Id. at 502, 844 S.E.2d at 559, n. 6. The Georgia Court of Appeals
held in Clough v. Richelo, that Rule 3.7 does not apply to a lawyer’s participation in pretrial
activities. 274 Ga. App. 129, 137–38, 616 S.E.2d 888, 895 (2005).
122. Mitchell, 355 Ga. App. at 502, 844 S.E.2d at 559.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 309 Ga. 675, 848 S.E.2d 75 (2020).
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arbitration clause was unenforceable because the lawyers had not
complied with their obligations under Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.4(b).126 Although there was no authority in Georgia about the
applicability of Rule 1.4(b) to arbitration clauses, the trial court relied on
the interpretation of Model Rule 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain to
clients the pros and cons of arbitration clauses in engagement
agreements.127
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, and then the Georgia
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions:
1. Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, is [a lawyer]
required to fully apprise his or her client of the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration before including a clause mandating
arbitration of legal malpractice claims in the parties’ engagement
agreement?
2. If so, does failing to so apprise a client render such a clause
unenforceable under Georgia law?128

The supreme court concluded that it need not answer the first
question.129 Even if the rules of conduct require lawyers to explain the
pros and cons of an arbitration agreement to clients, and the lawyers do
not do so, the arbitration agreement “is neither void as against public
policy nor unconscionable and therefore is not unenforceable on either of
those grounds.”130
The court dealt first with public policy. Generally, arbitration
agreements are favored in Georgia.131 There is no statutory exception for
arbitration of legal malpractice claims, and the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct encourage arbitration of fee disputes between
lawyers and clients.132 The court recognized that there are cases in
Georgia in which the supreme court or the court of appeals has cited to

126. Id.; See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (2021) (requiring lawyers to “explain
a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”).
127. Innovative Images, 309 Ga. at 677, 848 S.E.2d at 78; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro.
Resp., Formal Op. 02-425 (1974) (interpreting Model Rule 1.4(b), which is identical to
Georgia Rule 1.4(b)).
128. Innovative Images, 309 Ga. at 677–78, 848 S.E.2d at 78.
129. Id. The court wrote that “we will leave it to the State Bar of Georgia to address in
the first instance whether this is a subject worthy of a formal advisory opinion about or [an]
amendment to the GRPC.” Id. at 679, 848 S.E.2d at 79.
130. Id. at 681, 848 S.E.2d at 80.
131. Id. at 682, 848 S.E.2d at 81.
132. Id.
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violations of the rules of conduct in support of decisions that held
agreements invalid as a matter of public policy.133 But the court
distinguished such by pointing out that in those cases, the problem was
the substance of the agreement—such as an agreement that purported to
limit the ability of a client to fire a lawyer—and that is unlike the issue
in the case before it, which was about the process of entering into the
agreement (with or without disclosure of disadvantages of arbitration). 134
The court then turned to the question of unconscionability. It noted
that this doctrine has two components—substantive unconscionability
and procedural unconscionability. 135 A contract to arbitrate legal
malpractice claims could be substantively unconscionable only if “no sane
client would enter a contract that mandated arbitration of future legal
malpractice claims and no honest lawyer would take advantage of such a
provision.”136 The court dismissed this notion, noting that the client in
the case was complaining of the process by which it agreed to the clause,
rather than the notion of arbitration in general; the court also pointed
out that arbitration has advantages as well as disadvantages for clients
and emphasized again that arbitration clauses are favored in Georgia. 137
Procedural unconscionability applies if the process of entering into the
contract indicates that one party took “fraudulent advantage” of the
other. The court rejected this argument because the former client had
failed to discharge its burden to show that its lawyer had engaged in any
fraudulent conduct.138 The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
decision that the law firm’s motion to compel arbitration should have
been granted.139
V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a grant of habeas relief to a
defendant who pled guilty amidst a trial in which he was accused of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. 140 His codefendant testified that she was “just a user” and that the drugs were not
hers.141 The defendant pled guilty because his counsel had no
incriminating evidence with which to impeach the co-defendant. Between
133.
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the date of the guilty plea and the date of sentencing, defense counsel
learned that there was an outstanding warrant for the arrest of the codefendant for the sale of methamphetamine. The warrant had not been
served. Defense counsel could have used this information at trial to
impeach the co-defendant’s testimony; as soon as he learned about the
warrant, the defendant wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because the
warrant was evidence that his co-defendant was the one selling the
drugs. Defense counsel did not advise the defendant that he had the
absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea at any time before the
sentencing hearing. After the sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a
motion to withdraw his plea, but the motion was rejected as untimely.142
The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s findings that the defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not informing the defendant of
his right to withdraw his guilty plea once the defense learned about the
co-defendant’s warrant (before the sentencing hearing), and that
counsel’s failure to render effective assistance prejudiced the
defendant.143 The prejudice was that the defendant lost his absolute right
to withdraw the guilty plea and insist on trial by jury.144
In another case, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not raising a general demurrer to an
indictment that was void because it failed to allege predicate offenses
underlying the charges sufficiently.145 The supreme court reviewed the
decision solely for the question of prejudice to the defendant. 146 The
supreme court agreed with the appellate court and found that there was
prejudice.147 The defendant was convicted of several felony charges that
arose from an automobile accident that caused one death and numerous
serious injuries.148 The State admitted that the indictment was defective
but argued that the defendant could not show prejudice from her
counsel’s failure to demur.149
The State argued first that the indictment was defective, but it
nevertheless gave the defendant sufficient notice of the charges.150 The
supreme court rejected this argument because questions of notice relate
to special demurrers to the form of an indictment rather than general
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demurrers to its substance. With or without adequate notice of the
charges, a general demurrer to a substantively defective indictment
would have been sustained, and the defendant could not have been
convicted of the felony counts. 151
The State’s second argument was that, if the demurrer had been filed,
the State would simply have re-indicted the defendant; the subsequent
trial likely would have led to the same result as the one in which the
defendant was convicted.152 The supreme court also rejected this
argument. For one thing, trial counsel could have raised the general
demurrer at any time during the trial, after jeopardy had attached, and
possibly barred any re-indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The
supreme court did not rest its holding on that basis, however. 153 It set
aside the double jeopardy argument and noted that, regardless of how
some future hypothetical trial might turn out, if counsel had filed the
general demurrer, there is no question that the defendant’s first trial
would have had a different and more favorable outcome for her.154 She
could not have been convicted under a void indictment; therefore, there
was sufficient prejudice to the defendant from counsel’s failure to file the
general demurrer.155
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to one of the charges on
which the defendant was convicted in Harris v. State.156 The defendant
was convicted of felony shoplifting, and the only evidence presented of
her commission of the crime was testimony from police officers about
what store employees had said to them and a dashcam video in which a
store employee said that she saw “two females removing sensors from
merchandise and that she could identify exactly which items of clothing
were stolen.”157 Defense counsel did not object to this obvious hearsay,
and the court of appeals held that there was prejudice to the defendant
because there was no other evidence to establish the elements of the
crime.158 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion for new trial on that charge but not the numerous
other charges.159
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The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a separate
case with the same name, Harris v. State.160 The defendant pled not
guilty to numerous crimes, with the least serious being possession of a
small amount of methamphetamine. The evidence against the defendant
was quite strong, and in closing argument of the defendant’s bench trial,
his counsel made a spur-of-the-moment decision to concede his client’s
guilt on that count. The defense attorney did not consult with the
defendant about this concession, and the defendant was convicted on all
counts.161
On appeal, the defendant argued that his trial counsel’s unilateral
decision to concede guilt was ineffective assistance that amounted to a
structural error that required reversal, even without a showing of
prejudice.162 The argument was based on McCoy v. Louisiana,163 in which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that it violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a defense lawyer to
concede guilt in the face of the defendant’s “intransigent and
unambiguous objection” to the concession.164 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees the defendant’s autonomy to decide the objectives of the
defense, and that includes the decision to maintain innocence in the face
of overwhelming evidence of guilt. 165 In Harris, however, the Georgia
Court of Appeals distinguished McCoy, in part because the defendant’s
not guilty plea to the possession charge was not the same as an
“intransigent and unambiguous instruction” not to concede guilt. 166 The
court of appeals also noted that the Supreme Court had “previously held
that an attorney is not per se ineffective for adopting a strategy to
concede guilt, even if his client does not expressly consent to that
strategy.”167
The court of appeals also rejected the defendant’s more conventional
claims of ineffective assistance, which required a showing of
unprofessional representation and a reasonable probability of a different
result.168 Although the trial counsel misunderstood one of the elements
of the crime of possession, he testified at the hearing on the motion for
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new trial that, even if he had understood the crime correctly, he would
have made the same decision to concede guilt. The court reiterated that
it is not unreasonable per se for a lawyer to concede guilt on a lesser
charge as a strategy to avoid conviction on a more serious one, which was
exactly what trial counsel claimed he was trying to do.169
In a separate argument, the defendant asserted that his counsel’s
failure to consult with him about the concession of guilt was ineffective
assistance.170 The court of appeals rejected this argument as well
because, considering the evidence on the possession charge, there was no
reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted
even if his counsel had not conceded guilt.171
VI. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed Greene County Superior
Court’s decision not to disqualify the lawyers who represented the
plaintiff in Georgia Trails & Rentals, Inc. v. Rogers.172 The plaintiff was
a young man who at the age of fifteen, had been severely injured in a
motorcycle accident during an off-road race at a recreational facility. The
plaintiff’s lawyers also represented the plaintiff’s parents, and the
defendants sought to disqualify the plaintiff’s lawyers on the basis of an
alleged conflict of interest; the argument was that there was a conflict in
representing the plaintiff, who attained the age of eighteen before the
case was over, and also the parents, because the plaintiff may have had
a claim against his father for failure to warn him about the dangers of
riding a motorbike. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there
was no evidence of an actual conflict as opposed to theories about
potential conflicts. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that the father
was included on the special verdict form’s allocation of fault at trial and
that there was evidence that the plaintiff waived any conflict after being
fully informed of the risks.173
In Tucker v. State,174 a defendant was represented at trial by a lawyer
with the Houston County Public Defender’s Office.175 Trial counsel left
that office in 2015; years later, the trial court appointed another member

169. Id.
170. Id. at 810, 856 S.E.2d at 384.
171. Id. This is a separate question from whether trial counsel’s failure to consult
violated Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct r. 1.2(a) and 1.4, which impose duties of
consultation.
172. 359 Ga. App. 207, 855 S.E.2d 103 (2021).
173. Id.
174. 355 Ga. App. 796, 845 S.E.2d 759 (2020).
175. Id. at 800, 845 S.E.2d at 763.
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of the Houston County Public Defender’s Office to argue the defendant’s
motion for new trial and to prosecute his appeal, both of which asserted
the ineffectiveness of the original trial counsel. 176
One question for the court of appeals was whether the second lawyer
had an imputed conflict of interest. 177 A lawyer has a conflict of interest
in arguing his own ineffectiveness, and, generally speaking, the conflicts
of one member of a public defender’s office are imputed to all members of
the office.178 Therefore, a public defender cannot argue the
ineffectiveness of another lawyer in the same office.179 In Tucker,
however, the original trial counsel left the public defender’s office years
before the new lawyer joined the office and years before the new lawyer
was appointed to argue the motion for new trial and the appeal; the court
of appeals held that, in these circumstances, the original trial counsel’s
conflict would not be imputed to the other lawyers in the office where he
worked years before.180
VII. JUDICIAL CONDUCT
State,181

In Woody v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals faced the question
of whether, or under what circumstances, judicial misconduct that causes
a mistrial in a criminal case gives rise to a double jeopardy defense to a
retrial.182 During the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the
judge initiated a break during which the judge advised the witness,
outside the presence of the prosecutor or defense counsel, to be sure to
establish a chain of custody. The witness informed the prosecutor, who
in turn informed defense counsel, and the prosecutor’s motion for a
mistrial was immediately granted. When the defendant raised a double
jeopardy plea in bar to a retrial, a different judge denied the plea, and
the defendant appealed. The court of appeals held that it did not have to
decide whether judicial misconduct could be imputed to the prosecution
or serve as an independent basis for a double jeopardy defense. 183 Even
if the court reached either conclusion, the defendant would still have to
prove that the misconduct was intended to goad the defense into making
a motion for mistrial; intent merely to aid the prosecution, even by

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 799–800, 845 S.E.2d at 762–63.
Id.
Id. at 800, 845 S.E.2d at 763.
Id. at 800–01, 845 S.E.2d at 763.
357 Ga. App. 752, 849 S.E.2d 527 (2020).
Id. at 753–54, 849 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 755, 849 S.E.2d at 529.
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impermissible means, is not sufficient. 184 The court held that the
evidence before the trial court on the plea in bar did not demonstrate that
the judge’s ex parte contact with the witness was intended to bring the
trial to an end.185 It, therefore, affirmed the denial of the double jeopardy
plea.186
Two matters involved Griffin Judicial Circuit Superior Court Judge,
Robert “Mack” Crawford.
First, the Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission
found that Judge Crawford violated Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires judges to respect and comply with the law. 187
When Judge Crawford was in private practice, he deposited funds into
the registry of the superior court of Pike County. Apparently because he
believed at least some of the funds were owed to him as attorney’s fees,
and after taking judicial office, Judge Crawford succeeded in persuading
the Clerk of Court to disburse $15,675.62 to him. The hearing panel
found that Judge Crawford violated Rule 1.1 in two respects. First, he
obtained the disbursement without following the requirements of the
Uniform Superior Court Rules. Second, he impermissibly converted the
funds for his personal benefit. The hearing panel recommended that
Judge Crawford be removed from office but did not recommend that he
be banned from holding judicial office in the future. 188 By the time of the
supreme court’s review of the hearing panel’s decision, Judge Crawford
pled guilty to misdemeanor theft and, as part of his plea bargain, agreed
to serve twelve months probation, to resign his judicial office, and not to
seek or hold judicial office until his probation was complete.189
The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding.190 It noted that
it was indisputable that Judge Crawford had not followed the Uniform
Superior Court Rules in obtaining the disbursement, but opined that the
evidence of impermissible conversion of the funds was “not
overwhelming.”191 In light of Judge Crawford’s resignation, however, the
supreme court saw no need to render a definitive decision on that
question; the sanction recommended by the hearing panel was removal

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 755–56, 849 S.E.2d at 529–30.
Id. at 757, 849 S.E.2d at 530.
Id.
In re Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 851 S.E.2d 572, 573 (2020); See GA. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.1 (2021).
188. Id. at 403, 851 S.E.2d at 573.
189. Id. at 405, 851 S.E.2d at 574, n. 4.
190. Id. at 407, 852 S.E.2d at 575.
191. Id. at 405, 851 S.E.2d at 574.
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from office, and that had already occurred. 192 The court considered
whether it should enter an order permanently banning Judge Crawford
from holding judicial office in the future but decided that would not be
appropriate, in light of the less-than-overwhelming evidence on the
question of conversion, the fact that his actions were not directly related
to the exercise of judicial duties, the judge’s voluntary resignation from
office, his agreement not to seek or hold judicial office while on probation,
and the lack of any evidence in the record that he intended to seek or hold
judicial office in the future.193 In an opinion joined by Justices Boggs,
Peterson, and Bethel, Justice Blackwell concurred to express doubts that
under the Georgia Constitution the supreme court has the power to ban
someone from ever holding judicial office in the future. 194
In the second matter involving Judge Crawford, a defendant who was
convicted of aggravated child molestation and other crimes sought
reversal of his convictions because Judge Crawford, the trial judge in his
case, allegedly had a conflict of interest that caused him to be biased in
favor of the State.195 The court of appeals found no reversible error in
connection with the judge’s alleged bias and affirmed the convictions. 196
The alleged conflict arose from the fact that Judge Crawford obtained the
payment from the registry of the court (as described above) during the
trial. Judge Crawford was later indicted on charges of theft by taking and
violation of oath by a public officer for ordering the clerk to issue the
check. The defendant argued that during the trial, Judge Crawford knew
he committed a criminal act and did not want to antagonize the State.
The judge denied any wrongdoing as well as any bias; the defendant’s
trial counsel did not believe that the judge was biased and did not seek
recusal at trial. There was no evidence of any actual impropriety. Under
these circumstances, the court of appeals concluded Judge Crawford had
no duty to recuse himself sua sponte and that there was no reasonable
basis to believe that he could not be impartial. 197
The Georgia Court of Appeals revisited a case in which a defendant
convicted of unlawful surveillance, aggravated sodomy, and other crimes
sought reversal based upon the failure of the superior court judge to
recuse himself.198 The defendant sought recusal based upon the fact that
the district attorney served as the judge’s campaign manager in an

192.
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194.
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197.
198.

Id.
Id. at 406–07, 851 S.E.2d at 574–75.
Id. at 407–10, 851 S.E.2d at 575–77 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
Zerbarini v. State, 359 Ga. App. 153, 855 S.E.2d 87 (2021).
Id. at 169–70, 855 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Serdula v. State, 356 Ga. App. 94, 845 S.E.2d 362 (2020).
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aborted campaign for a state-court judgeship. The judge denied the
motion to recuse without referring the matter to another judge, and in an
earlier appeal, the court held that another judge should have decided the
motion.199 The case was remanded for that purpose, and another judge
heard testimony about the relationship between the superior court judge
and the district attorney.200 The uncontradicted testimony of the district
attorney at that hearing was that he nominally served as campaign
manager but was not actively involved in the campaign and did not have
a particularly close relationship with the superior court judge. The
motion to recuse was accordingly denied, and the court of appeals
affirmed that ruling.201 Because the court of appeals found no other
reversible error, it affirmed the convictions. 202
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to recuse a
superior court judge in a case involving custody, visitation, and child
support.203 The mother claimed that the judge showed he was biased in
favor of the father by insisting that the mother’s attorney attend a
hearing after completing a hearing in another matter and by the
following actions:
As examples, the Mother pointed to, among other things, the trial
court’s: insistence on making her attorney appear for the September
18, 2019 hearing after concluding a hearing in another court listed in
a conflict letter; conducting the temporary hearing without notice to
the Mother; interrupting the Mother’s attorney during argument;
suggesting the Father prove his attorney fees in the absence of a
request for such fees; awarding temporary relief not requested by the
Father; scheduling a trial that conflicted with the Mother’s attorney’s
leave of absence; closing discovery over the Mother’s objection; and
waiving mediation.204

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s modification order
because it found that the judge had not afforded the mother sufficient
notice and opportunity to be heard.205 But the court of appeals affirmed
the denial of the motion to recuse, noting that a court’s rulings seldom
justify recusal and that there was no evidence that the judge’s alleged
bias arose from an extrajudicial source.206
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 96, 845 S.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 97, 845 S.E.2d at 367.
Id. at 106–07, 845 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 116, 845 S.E.2d at 380.
Bass v. Medy, 358 Ga. App. 827, 854 S.E.2d 763 (2021).
Id. at 829–30, 854 S.E.2d at 766.
Id.
Id. at 830–31, 854 S.E.2d at 767.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals disqualified a Special Master in a case
involving alleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty, in which the
plaintiff sought to dissolve a limited liability corporation that operated
hotels in three states.207 The trial court appointed an attorney to serve as
an auditor and Special Master in the case.208
A Special Master is essentially a part-time judge and is governed by
the Code of Judicial Conduct.209 The court held that the lawyer was
attempting to perform an impermissible combination of roles because, as
auditor, he would be an investigator and a witness, while as Special
Master, he would be the judge of fact and law. 210 The Code of Judicial
Conduct disqualifies a judge who has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts or has been a witness in the proceeding, while a Georgia
statute separately prohibits a judge from testifying as a witness in a
matter before him.211 Additionally, the Code of Judicial Conduct forbids
a judge from conducting investigations into the facts of a dispute, 212 yet
that is exactly what the lawyer in his capacity as the auditor was
expected to do.213 Because of the Special Master’s “fundamentally
incompatible duties,” the court of appeals held that it was an abuse of
discretion to appoint one person to fulfill all these roles. 214
VIII. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LIENS
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s default judgment
on behalf of a law firm against a former client.215 The firm and the former
client had entered into a contingency fee contract; when the law firm sued
to recover its fees, the former client defaulted by failing to participate in
discovery. The trial court eventually entered judgment against the
former client based in part upon the contingency-fee-formula set forth in
the contract, but the court of appeals reversed because the contingencies
recited in the contract never occurred. Therefore, the law firm’s remedy
was to recover the value of its services in quantum meruit. Because

207. A & M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 359 Ga. App. 271, 856 S.E.2d 704
(2021).
208. Id. at 271–73, 856 S.E.2d at 706–07.
209. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application (2021). “Anyone . . . who performs
judicial functions under the Constitution and [L]aws of Georgia, including . . . [a] [S]pecial
[M]aster . . . is a judge for the purpose of this Code.” Id.
210. A & M Hospitalities, 359 Ga. App. at 276, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
211. Id. at 275, 856 S.E.2d at 708; See O.C.G.A. § 9-7-1 (2021).
212. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(C) (2021).
213. A & M Hospitalities, 359 Ga. App. at 274, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
214. Id. at 276, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
215. Paris v. E. Michael Ruberti, LLC, 355 Ga. App. 748, 845 S.E.2d 720 (2020).
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quantum meruit damages are deemed unliquidated, the court of appeals
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the proper
amount of damages.216
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided one case about the attorney’s
lien statute during the Survey period.217 A law firm and a client entered
a contingency fee contract that provided for the law firm to receive 40%
of the client’s gross recovery as its fee. The contract also specified how
the fee would be calculated if the client terminated its relationship with
the firm: if the client fired the firm while a settlement offer was pending,
the firm would be entitled to 40% of the offer, plus expenses. Otherwise,
the firm could elect to seek a reasonable percentage of the client’s
recovery based upon the amount of work it had performed, or it could
seek recovery based on stated hourly rates. The contract granted the firm
a lien on the client’s recovery to secure the firm’s fees and expenses. 218
The defendant made a pre-suit settlement offer of $15,000, but the law
firm filed suit for the client, conducted discovery, and made a premediation settlement demand of $3,500,000. 219 When the client fired the
firm, it filed a notice of an attorney’s lien for $8,263.54, which is the sum
of 40% of the $15,000 settlement offer, plus the expenses the law firm
had incurred for the client. The case settled for $800,000. After the
hearing on foreclosure of the attorney’s lien, the court awarded the law
firm its costs plus 13.5% of the client’s recovery, which was the judge’s
assessment of a reasonable percentage of the client’s recovery based on
the effort expended by the firm. The trial court found that there was no
pending offer of settlement (the only offer from the defense had been the
$15,000 pre-suit offer, long before the $3,500,000 settlement demand
made by the plaintiff’s counsel). Therefore, under the fee contract, the
law firm was entitled to recover a reasonable percentage of the ultimate
settlement and not just 40% of the pre-suit settlement offer. The court of
appeals deferred to the trial court’s factual findings and affirmed.220
IX. CONTEMPT
The Georgia Court of Appeals vacated a contempt order entered by a
Bibb County Superior Court Judge against an attorney who allegedly
disobeyed the court’s commands by sending emails to opposing counsel
that lacked civility and were unprofessional. 221 The trial judge
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 726–27, 845 S.E.2d at 755.
McWay v. McKenney’s, Inc., 359 Ga. App. 547, 859 S.E.2d 523 (2021).
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Id.
Id. at 551, 859 S.E.2d at 527.
In re Spix, 358 Ga. App. 119, 853 S.E.2d 893 (2021).
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adjudicated the lawyer’s contempt summarily, without giving the lawyer
a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges, the right to seek the
assistance of counsel, or to call witnesses.222 The court of appeals wrote
that such summary procedures are permissible if the contumacious
conduct occurs in open court, but where, as in this case, the conduct
occurs outside of court, the attorney was entitled to “more normal
adversary procedures.”223
X. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT224
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled on some but not all of the proposed
rule changes that the State Bar of Georgia presented as a package in its
Motion to Amend 2020-1.225 The court approved several amendments to
Rule 1.6 on confidentiality.226 It added a new exception to the general
rule on confidentiality, under which a lawyer may reveal confidential
information to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve
conflicts of interest when a lawyer changes firms or a firm’s composition
or ownership changes, unless revealing the information would
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the
client.227 The court approved comments that provide further guidance on
this new exception as well as new comments explaining the lawyer’s duty
to use reasonable efforts to protect a client’s confidential information and
to take reasonable precautions when transmitting information relating
to the representation of a client. 228 The court also approved Rule 1.18, a
new rule spelling out a lawyer’s duties to a prospective client. These
duties include a duty of confidentiality, identical to the duty owed to
former clients, with respect to information a lawyer learns from a
prospective client—regardless of whether an attorney-client relationship
is formed.229 The new rule also disqualifies any lawyer, and the lawyer’s
firm, from representing anyone whose interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the prospective client in the same or a substantially
222. Id. at 119–21, 853 S.E.2d at 894–95.
223. Id.
224. The Author is a member of the State Bar of Georgia Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures Committee. This discussion is the Author’s alone and does not reflect any
opinion or policy of the rules committee or any of its members. The Author thanks William
NeSmith, Deputy General Counsel to the State Bar of Georgia, and Betty Derrickson,
paralegal in the office of the general counsel for the State Bar of Georgia, for their
assistance with this section.
225. Order of the Georgia Supreme Court (May 14, 2021).
226. Id. at *2.
227. Id. at *2–3.
228. Id. at *6–7.
229. Id. at *8–9.

186

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

related matter if the lawyer received from the prospective client
information that could be significantly harmful to the prospective client
in such a matter.230
The State Bar asked the court to amend the comments to Rule 1.1 on
competence.231 Under the proposed amendment, comment six would
read, “[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should
keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits
and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing
study and education, and comply with all continuing legal education
requirements to which the lawyer is subject.” 232 The proposed change is
based upon an amendment to the comments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.233 The Georgia Supreme Court did not reject or
approve the proposed amendment, but rather omitted any reference to it
in its ruling on the State Bar’s 2020-1 motion.234
XI. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS
A. State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board 235
The State Bar Formal Advisory Opinion Board (FAOB) considers
requests for formal advisory opinions that interpret the Georgia Rules of
230. Id. at *8–11.
231. Id. at *3–5.
232. In re STATE BAR OF GEORGIA Rules and Regulations for its Organization and
Government, Motion to Amend 2020-1, at *2–3.
233. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1, cmt. 8 (AM BAR ASS’N 2021).
234. Another pending change involves a prosecutor’s duties under Rule 3.8. In re State
Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations for its Organization and Government, Motion to
Amend 2021-2 at *22–32 (on file with the author). The proposed amendment would add two
requirements to Rule 3.8. One requires disclosure of any new, credible, and material
evidence that creates a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit the
offense. Id. at 23–24. The other requires a prosecutor to seek to remedy a conviction in the
prosecutor’s jurisdiction, when the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant did not commit the crime. Id. at 24. Also, just after the survey period ended,
the court rejected a proposed change to Rule 1.2 that would have allowed Georgia lawyers
to counsel and assist clients who operate businesses relating to marijuana that are legal
under Georgia law, but illegal under federal law. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at
2 (June 21, 2021). The court wrote: “[T]his Court has long prohibited Georgia lawyers from
counseling and assisting clients in the commission of criminal acts. The passage of a
Georgia statute purporting to permit and regulate conduct that constitutes federal crimes
does not change that long-standing principle.” Id. at 1–2.
235. The Author is a member of the State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion
Board. This discussion is the Author’s alone and does not reflect any opinion or policy of the
Board or any of its members. The Author thanks John Shiptenko, Senior Assistant General
Counsel to the State Bar of Georgia and staff liaison to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board,
for his assistance with this section.
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Professional Conduct.236 If the FAOB accepts a request, it drafts an
opinion and if the Board approves the draft, publishes it for comment in
an official State Bar publication or the State Bar website. 237 The FAOB
then reviews any comments and decides whether to approve the
opinion.238 The Georgia Supreme Court reviews some, but not all, of
FAOB’s opinions.239
During the Survey year, the FAOB dealt with one new matter and
several matters originating from prior years.
As noted above, the Georgia Supreme Court, in a case during the
Survey year, invited the State Bar of Georgia to consider whether it
would be appropriate to have an advisory opinion or a rule amendment
to guide lawyers about their disclosure obligations when they enter into
an arbitration clause with a client.240 The State Bar Office of the General
Counsel asked the FAOB to consider the issue, and the Board accepted
the invitation and appointed a subcommittee to study it. 241
Simultaneously, the State Bar Disciplinary Rules and Procedures
Committee was considering whether a rule amendment would be a more
efficient approach. At the close of the Survey period, the matter was still
pending before both the FAOB and the rules committee. 242
Request 19-R sought guidance regarding whether it is a violation of
the rules for a Georgia lawyer to buy Google Ad Words that include the
name of a competing attorney to appear first in the results of a search for
that lawyer.243 The FAOB appointed a subcommittee to examine the
issue but ultimately decided that the rules already adequately address
the issues presented by such conduct.244
Finally, the FAOB redrafted Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3,
concerning the permissibility of a lawyer’s contact with a former
constituent of a represented entity. 245 The new opinion is Formal
Advisory Opinion 20-1, and it concludes, as did Opinion 94-3, that such
contacts are permissible without the consent of the entity’s counsel if
certain conditions—including disclosure of the reason for the contact—
are met. After considering numerous comments about 20-1, the FAOB
236. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-403(a) (2021).
237. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-403(c) (2021).
238. Id.
239. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-403(d) –(e) (2021).
240. Innovative Images, 309 Ga. at 679, 848 S.E.2d at 79.
241. David N. Lefowitz, Formal Advisory Opinion Board, 2021 Report of the Office of
General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, 1, 12–13 (on file with the author).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 14.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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approved the opinion and sought discretionary review by the Georgia
Supreme Court. The court accepted the petition, and the matter was
pending before the supreme court after the Survey period.246
B. American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility
The formal opinions of the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association (ABA) do not
directly bind Georgia lawyers or courts. Georgia courts do, however,
frequently look to or cite ABA opinions as guidance. It is, therefore, worth
mentioning the ABA’s seven formal opinions that were issued during the
Survey year.
ABA Formal Opinion 492 concerns the proper interpretation of several
aspects of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.18, which sets forth a
lawyer’s obligations to a prospective client. 247 Since Georgia has adopted
a version of Rule 1.18, this opinion has more potential to influence the
professional responsibilities of Georgia lawyers. One significant
difference between Georgia’s new Rule 1.18 and the Model Rule is that,
whereas the Model Rule under some circumstances permits lawyers to
be screened to prevent the imputation of conflicts of interest, such
screening is not permitted in Georgia.248
ABA Formal Opinion 493 provides guidance on the purpose, scope, and
application of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), which makes it
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know is harassment on the basis of race, sex, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status, or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the
practice of law.249 Georgia is not among the few states that have adopted
a version of Rule 8.4(g).
ABA Formal Opinion 494 included detailed guidance for lawyers with
respect to conflicts of interest that arise from the lawyer’s relationships
with opposing counsel.250 The opinion divided such relationships into
three categories: intimate relationships, friendships, and acquaintances.
Without informed consent, a lawyer generally may not represent a client
when the lawyer is in an intimate relationship with opposing counsel.
Friendships come in a variety of forms and degrees and so must be
246. Id.
247. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. Formal Op. 492 (2020).
248. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia, at 8–11; See MODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.18 (2021).
249. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. Formal Op. 493 (2020).
250. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. Formal Op. 494 (2020).
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examined on a case-by-case basis. Generally, if the relationship is that of
mere acquaintances, then the relationship need not be disclosed to the
client and consent need not be obtained.251
ABA Formal Opinion 495 addressed the propriety of lawyers working
remotely from a jurisdiction in which they are not licensed. 252 The
necessities of life during the Covid-19 pandemic led many lawyers to do
this. The opinion concluded that a lawyer may engage in such work as
long as the local jurisdiction has not determined that it constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law and as long as lawyers do not hold
themselves out as licensed in the jurisdiction, they do not advertise or
otherwise hold themselves out as having an office in the jurisdiction, and
they do not provide or offer legal services in the jurisdiction except as
may otherwise be permitted under Rule 5.5. 253 Specifically, the opinion
noted that having local contact information on advertising or business
cards would violate Rule 5.5’s prohibition on establishing a local office in
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed. 254
In ABA Formal Opinion 496, the committee dealt with a lawyer’s
options in responding to online criticism from a former client. 255 A lawyer
may feel that a review is incorrect and be tempted to respond with a post
that reveals confidential client information. The ABA opinion concluded
that an online negative review of the lawyer, by itself, does not trigger
the lawyer’s option to reveal confidential information as a matter of selfdefense under Rule 1.6(b)(5).256 The opinion suggested, as a matter of best
practice, that lawyers should just not respond to negative online
reviews.257 Alternatively, a lawyer could ask the website or search engine
host to remove the post or respond without revealing confidential
information, such as posting an invitation to contact the lawyer or
posting a response that professional considerations preclude a full
response to the criticism.258
ABA Formal Opinion 497 provided guidance on what it means for a
representation to be “materially adverse” to the interests of a former
client or a prospective client.259 The opinion discussed some situations
that are clearly materially adverse, such as litigating or negotiating
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against a former client or a prospective client in the same or a
substantially related matter, attacking work done for a former client, and
cross-examining a former client or prospective client.260 A representation
can be materially adverse to a former client or prospective client even if
the former client or prospective client is not a party to the second matter;
such situations, including when a lawyer attacks her own work, must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.261 The opinion concluded, however,
that “materially adverse” does not include general economic or financial
adversity.262
Finally, ABA Formal Opinion 498 explored the most common ethical
problems associated with virtual practice, when a lawyer practices
without a traditional physical office.263 Virtual practice is permitted, but
lawyers still must comply with their ethical responsibilities under the
rules. The opinion discusses how the duties of competence, diligence, and
confidentiality are challenged in virtual practice—especially with respect
to the use of the technology that makes virtual practice possible. Lawyers
must also be especially sensitive to their duties of supervision of their
non-lawyer assistants and subordinate lawyers in a virtual practice. 264
XII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The Georgia General Assembly amended Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 9-11-67.1,265 relating to offers of settlement,
in a way that has serious implications for the professional responsibilities
of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Under the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in
Southern General Insurance Company v. Holt,266 an insurer who refuses
to settle a claim for its policy limits exposes itself to the risk of a claim
from its insured for negligent or bad-faith failure to settle.267 For
example, if an insured with $25,000 in coverage is responsible for an
accident that causes $100,000 in harm, and the injured party offers to
settle for the policy limits of $25,000, the insurance company may be
liable under certain circumstances for the entire claim, regardless of the
policy limits. It is routine for plaintiffs’ lawyers to make time-limited
demands on insurance companies to settle for policy limits and put
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Id. at *3.
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O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (2021).
262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).
Id. at 267, 416 S.E.2d 275.
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insurers to the choice of acceding to the demand or risking a claim for
negligent or bad-faith failure to settle.
The Georgia General Assembly decided in 2013 to regulate the process
by which time-limited settlement demands are made by enacting
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.268 Before the amendments that took effect on July
1, 2021, that statute provided that any pre-suit offers, prepared by or
with an attorney, to settle a claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or
death in connection with motor vehicle accidents had to be in writing and
contain certain terms.269 Those terms included the period within which
the offer could be accepted, at least thirty days from receipt; the amount
of the demand; the identities of who would be released; the type of
release; and the claims to be released.270 The statute did not forbid
additional terms; further, the inclusion of additional terms would
sometimes be ethically required.271 The plaintiff’s lawyer owes the client
a duty of competence, which includes the “thoroughness . . . reasonably
necessary for the representation.”272
An attorney for a plaintiff who suffered catastrophic injuries would
need, in the name of thoroughness, to add additional terms to a
settlement demand under certain circumstances. For example, suppose
that there was reason to suspect that the tortfeasor had additional
insurance (with the same insurer or any other); or if the tortfeasor had
substantial assets that could be used to satisfy a judgment; or if it was
not clear whether the tortfeasor was driving in the course and scope of
employment at the time of the accident, implicating the employer’s
insurance policy. Under the old version of § 9-11-67.1, the competent and
thorough plaintiff’s lawyer would condition the offer to settle for policy
limits on written assurances, such as by affidavit that no such additional
sources of recovery exist, or that the tortfeasor was not acting in the
course and scope of employment.273
That option is no longer permitted. In 2021, the Georgia General
Assembly amended § 9-11-67.1 to provide that a pre-answer settlement
demand must include certain terms and may:
include a term requiring that in order to settle the claim the recipient
shall provide the offeror a statement, under oath, . . . whether all
liability and casualty insurance issued by the recipient that provides
268. Frank E. Jenkins III and Wallace Miller III, GEORGIA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
LAW INCLUDING TORT LAW WITH FORMS § 21.8 (2020–2021 ed.).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (2021).
273. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.
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coverage or that may provide coverage for the claim at issue has been
disclosed to the offeror.274

Otherwise, absent mutual agreement, under the new version of
§ 9-11-67.1, no other terms may be included in the offer.275 It is not proper
under this code provision to condition the offer on representations about
other insurance coverage that may be available from another carrier; or
about whether the tortfeasor has sufficient assets to pay the claim if it
exceeds the policy limits; or about facts regarding the accident—
including whether the tortfeasor was working at the time. 276
The new statute creates a dilemma for a plaintiff’s lawyer. If there is
reason to suspect that other insurance or assets are available to satisfy a
claim, it would not be reasonably thorough for the lawyer to offer to settle
a claim for the policy limits of one insurer without some assurance that
such resources do not exist. A requirement that the recipient of the
settlement demand provides such an assurance is now an improper
additional term to the demand under § 9-11-67.1, with the result perhaps
that the insurer who rejects the demand cannot later be held liable under
Holt for a bad faith refusal to settle. 277 The new statute is at least a
partial gutting of Holt because the lawyer’s professional duty of
competence in some cases will make it impossible to provide a reasonable
opportunity to settle without filing a lawsuit; a plaintiff’s attorney may
need the power of subpoena and the tools of discovery to learn facts that
previously could have been sorted out in settlement without a lawsuit.
Ironically, a statute governing the process of avoiding lawsuits may
require competent counsel to file more lawsuits.
XIII.CONCLUSION
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia legal ethics
through May 31, 2021. For updates on developments after that date, you
may visit the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism
website.278
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